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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Daniel Steven White, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw guilty pleas to 
dealing in material harmful to a minor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The State regroups Defendant's seven arguments into two: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw 
Defendant's guilty pleas? 
Standard of Review. A denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion; any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 
State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, U 7,140 P.3d 1288. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering diagnostic assessments 
of Defendant before sentencing him? 
Standard of Review. A sentencing decision will be overturned only if "the 
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, % 18,191 P.3d 17. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are attached in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October 2005, Defendant was charged with two counts of rape, or, in the 
alternative, unlawful sexual activity with a minor (R. 3-1). In the same Information, 
he was also charged with two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004) (id.). 
All of the charges arose from Defendant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-
old girl (R. 4-3 & 15-14). 
The prosecutor provided defense counsel, Anthony Rippa, with a lengthy 
police report that summarized the victim's two videotaped interviews at the 
Division of Children and Family Services [DCFS] (R. 69 & 105; R257:12). The report 
and other discovery revealed that during the first interview, with a social worker, 
2 
the fourteen-year-old victim admitted she was having sex with someone older than 
herself, but refused to identify the person, other than to deny it was Defendant (R. 
15-14 & 69; R257:12). During a second interview, with a police detective, the victim 
reluctantly admitted that Defendant was her boyfriend and that they had engaged 
in sexual intercourse at least 15 times (id.). At Defendant's request, she had 
photographed him in the nude, with his "turgid" penis exposed (id.). The defense 
was provided with copies of the photographs (R257:13).l 
On the day of preliminary hearing, a plea agreement was reached: Defendant 
would plead guilty to the two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor and 
the two rape/sexual activity charges would be dismissed (R.34 & 34; R115:2). The 
court asked the prosecutor if she had consulted the victim or her family: 
Prosecutor: Yes, I have your Honor. The victim's father and mother are 
here [in the courtroom]. I have talked with them about the resolution. 
The victim is also here. She's not present in the courtroom, but she's in 
the courthouse. I've spoken with her about the resolution. They are in 
agreement with it. 
lrThis discovery, including the police summary of the interviews, was 
provided to the defense in the months before Defendant pled (R257:12). None of 
this information is sealed. 
A copy of the videotaped interviews was not provided until after Defendant 
had entered his plea (R. 98). A DVD version and transcript of the interviews, 
together with the photographs of Defendant, are included in the record, but are 
under seal (R. 245). The State refers to the sealed portions of the record only in 
general terms and as necessary to respond to Defendant's allegations. 
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(R115:3). The court then conducted a colloquy with Defendant pursuant to rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R115:2-8).2 A written Statement in Advance of 
Plea was signed by Defendant and incorporated into the record (R. 42-37). In the 
Statement, Defendant acknowledged that no promise had been made to him as to 
what sentence he would receive and that he knew he could be sentenced to prison 
(R. 38-39). The court asked the prosecutor to state the factual basis for the pleas: 
Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor. Between June 1st of 2005 and October 1st 
of 2005 [,] the defendant was engaged with - in a sexual relationship 
with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which is in Utah County. As part 
of that relationship he had her take pictures of himself while sexually 
aroused, and they are pornographic - those pictures are pornographic 
in nature... She not only took the pictures. She also saw them, viewed 
them. . . Exhibited them to her. 
(R115:7-8). The court asked Defendant, "Is that what happened on those occasions, 
sir?" Defendant responded, "Yes, sir" (R115: 8). See also Addendum B. 
The court found that the guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary (R115: 7). 
The court ordered a presentence investigative report [PSR] and directed that it 
include a psychosexual evaluation of Defendant because "we're dealing with a 14-
year-old" victim (R115: 8). Defendant did not object (id.). 
2
 Rule 11 "is designed to protect an individual's rights when entering a guilty 
plea by ensuring that the defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements, 
how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, [and] the consequences of the 
plea[.]" State v. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 17,173 P.3d 842 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
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The PSR was completed one month later, in March 2006 (R. 101).3 The report 
summarized Defendant's prior sexual offense with a different victim, his prolonged 
involvement with the juvenile system, and Dr. Larry Fox's current psychosexual 
evaluation of Defendant, including the doctor's recommendation that Defendant 
receive sex offender treatment in a secure setting (id. at 2-5). The PSR recommended 
that Defendant serve a year in jail and then be released on probation, subject to his 
participation in a sex-offender treatment program (id.). 
Defendant hired new counsel (Thomas Burton), his present appellate counsel 
(R. 46 & 44). New counsel reviewed the discovery previously provided and then 
subpoenaed "any and all" DCFS records that"directly or indirectly" referred to the 
victim or any member of her family (R. 63-59). After DCFS objected to the 
subpoena, it was quashed (R. 72-86). Nevertheless, the defense was provided with a 
copy and a transcript of the DCFS interviews of the victim, the same interviews that 
had previously been summarized in a lengthy police report provided to the defense 
(R. 98; R257:12). 
Subsequently, the defense filed a motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty 
pleas, asserting that the prosecution committed misconduct in failing to turn over a 
copy of the DCFS interviews before Defendant pled guilty; that Defendant's plea 
3
 Because the PSR is under seal, the State refers to its contents only in general 
terms and as necessary to response to Defendant's assertions. 
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counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty before receiving those tapes 
and before a preliminary hearing was conducted; and that the facts admitted by 
Defendant when he pled guilty did not as a matter of laiw constitute a crime (R. 99-
92). Defendant further alleged that if he had had the DCFS tapes earlier, he would 
not have pled guilty because, the tapes established tihat the victim would have 
refused to testify (R. 98; R257: 4). The prosecutor disputed the allegation and 
responded that the motion failed to establish that Defendant's pleas were not 
knowing and voluntary (R. 11442; R257:13). 
The court reviewed the DCFS tapes (R. 145). The court found that the DCFS 
tapes contained no new or pivotal information (R. 144). The court found nothing to 
support Defendant's allegation that the victim would have refused to testify. The 
court found that, at best, the tapes showed that the fourteen-year-old victim "clearly 
felt responsible for the sexual conduct" because she had agreed to it (R.145). The 
court found, however, that in the second interview, the victim "plainly described 
sexual contact between herself and the Defendant, whom she eventually, albeit 
reluctantly, described" (id.). Consequently, the court found that neither the DCFS 
tapes nor Defendant's other arguments warranted withdrawal of the pleas (R. 139 
&145-44). See also Addendum C. 
Defense counsel moved to continue sentencing (R. 149: R253: 4). Counsel 
complained that the PSR and Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation were "flawed" 
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because they considered Defendant's sexual involvement with the victim and other 
aspects of his sexual history, even though the rape charges had been dismissed 
(R253: 3-4). The court noted that the PSR "raises as many questions [about 
Defendant]... as it answers" and ordered a more detailed assessment of Defendant 
at the 90-day diagnostic unit at the state prison (R253:4). Defense counsel did not 
object, but asked if the defense could procure an independent psychosexual 
evaluation (id.). The court said the defense could gather whatever additional 
information it wished during the 90 days Defendant was at the unit (R253: 7-8). 
Sentencing was set for March 2007 (id.). 
One month later, in January 2007, the court informed the parties that 
Defendant refused to cooperate with the diagnostic unit and that the unit believed 
"further evaluation would [not] be beneficial" (R254: 3). The court ordered 
Defendant transferred back to jail and moved sentencing up to February (R254:4-5). 
Defense counsel did not object, except to ask if Defendant could be released on bail 
(R254:3-5). The court refused because it was "not convinced that [Defendant's], that 
he's, safe in the community"(R254: 5). 
On February 15,2007, Defendant was sentenced (R255:12). Defense counsel 
asked that the two felonies be treated as one and Defendant placed on probation 
(R255: 5). Defense counsel explained that Defendant's refusal to cooperate at the 
diagnostic unit was at counsel's direction (R255:8). The court asked why an "officer 
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of the court" would direct a client not to cooperate (R255: 8-9). Defense counsel 
explained that he did not want Defendant to incriminate himself by admitting to 
other offenses. Defense counsel complained that the unit tried to "brainwash" 
Defendant into admitting he had a sexual problem and was a sexual predator, but 
that it was the fourteen-year-old victim who was "the instigator" (R255: 9-10). 
Defense counsel characterized Fox's psychosexual evaluation as "total 
misrepresentations, total bias, total one-sidedness" (R255: 11). When Defendant 
addressed the court, he said simply: "I realize that what I did was wrong, I 
shouldn't have allowed it to happen" (id.). 
The court found that Defendant was not "safe to be released to the 
community" and sentenced him to concurrent terms of zero-to-five years 
imprisonment (R255:12). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fourteen-year-old C. W. believed that there was nothing wrong in having sex 
with nineteen-year-old Defendant and for months, they did (R. 15-14; R115: 7). 
C.W/s stepfather became suspicious, searched C.W/s room, and found her 
digital camera (R. 14). In it, he discovered photographs of Defendant, posing in the 
nude and holding his "turgid penis" (R. 14). See also R115: 7-8. The stepfather 
contacted the police and gave them the camera (R.14). 
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A DCFS social worker interviewed C.W. (R. 15). C.W. agreed that she was 
having sex with an older boyfriend, but refused to name him and denied it was 
Defendant (R. 15-14). A few days later, a police detective interviewed C.W. (R. 14). 
Reluctantly, C.W. identified Defendant as her boyfriend, admitted they had had 
sexual intercourse at least 15 times, and disclosed that Defendant had asked her to 
photograph him (R. 14). See also R101 (Interviews). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts multiple reasons why the trial court erred, but his seven 
issues are really two: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
to withdraw Defendant's guilty pleas? And did the court abuse its discretion in 
ordering diagnostic evaluations of Defendant before sentencing him? The answer to 
both questions is no. 
This Court need not address the merits, however, because Defendant fails to 
properly marshal the facts that support the trial court's rulings. Alternatively, the 
trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw. The court correctly found that 
the DCFS tapes contained no new or pivotal evidence and did not support 
Defendant's allegation that the victim would have refused to testify. The court 
further found that Defendant's pleas were fully supported by the facts and were not 
conditioned upon a promise of no prison. 
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Defendant's other claims involving the presentence diagnostic evaluations are 
not preserved and have no bearing on the validity of his guilty pleas. Consequently, 
their merits should not be considered in reviewing the denial of the motion to 
withdraw. Alternatively, to the extent these claims challenge Defendant's sentence, 
they are also largely unpreserved and, in any case, lack merit. The court 
appropriately gathered information about Defendant from multiple sources before 
exercising its discretion and sentencing him to prison. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW DEFENDANTS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 
GUILTY PLEAS 
Defendant asserts that his convictions are " totally unfair" because "nothing 
[he] has done is worthy of his being a convicted felon for having been briefly 
photographed by a minor on his premises in his bed and bedroom/' Br.Aplt at 43. 
Defendant claims he should be "exonerated for the State's persistent disregard of 
due process, both procedural and substantive." Id. at 44. At the same time, he 
concedes that when he pled guilty, he admitted that he had a prolonged sexual 
relationship with the fourteen-year-old victim and asked her to photograph him as 
he posed nude with his turgid penis exposed. Id. at 26-27. 
10 
Nevertheless, he asserts that that his guilty pleas should be vacated because: 
(1) he received only a police summary of the victim's interviews, not the actual 
tapes, before he pled guilty; (2) the prosecutor allegedly agreed not to recommend 
prison, but Defendant was sentenced to prison; (3) the facts Defendant admitted do 
not constitute a crime; (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a psychosexual 
examination; (5) the use of a penile plethysmograph "for any purpose" is 
unconstitutional; (6) the 90-day diagnostic unit is unconstitutional; and a general 
catch-all claim that (7) Defendant's procedural and substantive due process rights 
were Id. at 3-4. 
The Court need not address the merits of Defendant's claims, because he fails 
to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's ruling. See State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 
2008 UT App 191, If 20,186 P.3d 1023 (reaffirming that when an appellant fails to 
marshal the facts, as required by rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
appellate court may refuse to consider the merits and summarily affirm). 
Alternatively, the trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw. 
This Court also need not consider the merits of claims not raised in the motion 
to withdraw and not relevant to the validity of the pleas—such as Defendant's 
presentence diagnostic challenges. Alternatively, to the extent these claims are an 
attack of Defendant's sentence, they are likewise not preserved and/or lack merit. 
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A. Defendant's challenge to his guilty pleas is limited to the issues 
raised in the motion to withdraw that relate to the knowing and 
voluntary nature of the pleas. 
Though Defendant argues seven grounds to vacate his pleas, only those 
arguments that were raised in his motion to withdraw and that negate the knowing 
and voluntary nature of his pleas should be considered. 
In 2003, Utah narrowed the basis upon which a guilty plea may be 
withdrawn. Whereas before, a plea could be withdrawn for "good cause," Utah law 
now permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn only upon "a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 
2008). This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah 
1993) (recognizing that whether a plea is knowing and voluntary is a constitutional 
determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good cause" 
standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Compare Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to 
comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea 
unknowing or involuntary), with State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 
1994) (applying pre-2003 Utah law to hold that failure to comply with rule 11 
constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a guilty plea). Nevertheless, when a guilty 
plea is entered in compliance with rule 11, the plea is presumed to be knowing and 
voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT12, | 22, 26 P.3d 203. 
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Entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea "waives all non-jurisdictional 
challenges to a conviction... includ[ing] pre-plea constitutional violations/' Medel 
v. State, 2008 UT 32, If 26, 184 P.3d 1226 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Consequently, once a plea is entered, the "only avenue" to challenge the 
conviction is to move the trial court to vacate the plea because it is not knowing and 
voluntary. Id. See also Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6(2). And on appeal, only 
those grounds properly preserved in the motion to withdraw should be considered, 
unless plain error or exceptional circumstances are established. State v. Dean, 2004 
UT 63, f 13,95 P.3d 276. 
Here, Defendant ignores these requirements and limitations. For the first 
time on appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the diagnostic assessments and 
the authority of the court to order these assessments. See Br.Aplt. at 35-38. Because 
these issues were not raised in the motion to withdraw, they are not preserved and 
should not be considered as grounds to vacate Defendant's plea. Instead, these 
issues are relevant, if at all, only to Defendant's sentence. 
Similarly, Defendant is precluded from arguing pre-plea discovery violations, 
including constitutional violations, as a basis to withdraw his pleas unless he 
establishes that those violations negated the knowing and voluntary nature of his 
pleas. See Medel, 2008 UT 32, | f 26 & 35. The trial court correctly recognized this 
13 
limitation and considered the DCFS tapes only in the context of the knowing and 
voluntary nature of Defendant's pleas (R. 145-44). See also Add. C. 
In sum, the only challenges to the pleas that are properly before this Court 
are: (1) whether delay in receiving the DCFS tape impacted the knowing nature of 
Defendant's pleas, (2) whether there is a factual basis to support the pleas, and (3) 
whether the pleas were conditioned upon a promise of no prison. 
B. Defendant's challenge to his pleas should be summarily rejected 
because he fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial courf s 
denial of the motion to withdraw. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires Defendant to 
gather and recite "every scrap of competent evidence" that supports the trial court's 
factual findings and ruling he challenges and "demonstrate how the [trial] court 
found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict 
the clear weight of the evidence." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f If 26 & 39,140 P.3d 1200 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, f f 76, 11, 100 P.3d 1177). To meet this requirement, Defendant must 
"temporarily remove [his] own prejudices" and "fully embrace the [State's] 
position" to demonstrate why, despite the evidence that supports the ruling and 
findings, the trial court nevertheless erred. United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, 
f 26. Defendant's failure to comply with the marshaling requirement permits this 
Court to summarily reject his claims. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. 
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At no point in his brief, does Defendant properly marshal the facts supporting 
the findings he challenges. For example, Defendant alleges that when he received 
the DCFS tapes after the entry of his pleas, he "learned for the first time that [the 
fourteen-year-old victim] took full responsibility for initiating the relationship, 
refused to identify him until forced by the police in the absence of counsel, and 
would most likely, not have testified against the defendant/7 BrAplt at 20. After 
reviewing the DCFS tapes, the trial rejected this interpretation of the facts and found 
that the victim, "at best/' was reluctant to identify Defendant (R. 145). The court 
found that while the minor victim felt responsible because she factually, but not 
legally, consented to the illegal conduct, she ultimately and truthfully named 
Defendant and described their sexual relationship (id.). Rather than marshaling the 
facts supporting these findings, Defendant largely ignores them and repeats his trial 
arguments. BrAplt at 19-29. Moreover, Defendant's claim that the police "forced" 
the victim to identity Defendant has no record support.4 A review of the interviews 
reveals that the social worker and the police detective were professional and polite 
at all times and interested only in the welfare of the minor victim. See R. 245 
(Interviews). 
4
 The court did not address this claim because it correctly opined that even if, 
hypothetically, the victim's rights were violated, this provided no basis to vacate 
Defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty pleas (R.144 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978)). 
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Defendant also alleges that his plea is "null and void" because it was 
conditioned upon a promise of no prison. BrAplt. at 22-24. The court found, 
however, that the pleas were not conditioned on a promise regarding Defendant's 
sentence and that he was warned he could be imprisoned up to five years on each 
count (R. 140-39). Defendant not only ignores this finding, he goes further. In 
disregard of the record, he claims the prosecutor advocated that a prison sentence 
be imposed, when the prosecutor did not. Compare BrAplt at 23, with R115: 7. 
Similarly, Defendant claims there is no factual basis to support the pleas 
because he did not direct the victim to take the photographs and the photographs 
do not depict him in a state of arousal. BrAplt at 15,29 & 32. The court found that 
Defendant's admissions at the time of the plea negated this claim (R. 141). When 
Defendant pled, he agreed that he "had [the victim] take pictures of himself while 
sexually aroused and . . . those pictures are pornographic in nature" (R. 115: 7-8). 
The photographs themselves support the trial court's finding. See R. 245 
(Photographs). Yet, Defendant ignores the court's finding and the physical evidence 
to argue an unsupported version of the facts. 
In sum, Defendant's failures to properly marshal alone justify summary 
affirmance of the trial court's ruling. Chen, 2004 UT 82 at \ 3; Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 
UT App 191 at \ 7. Alternatively, the trial court's findings are supported by the 
record and justify the denial of the motion to withdraw. 
16 
C The trial court correctly found that the DCFS tapes did not impact 
the validity of Defendant's pleas. 
In total disregard of the marshaled facts and trial court's findings, Defendant 
claims that his pleas should be vacated because the prosecutor withheld exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He charges that the 
prosecutor deliberately misled him into pleading guilty even though the State "had 
no case" against him. See BrAplt. at 19-22. Defendant asserts that only after he pled 
guilty and received a copy of the DCFS interviews, did he realize that the fourteen-
year-old victim "took full responsibility for initiating the relationship, refused to 
identify him until forced by the police in the absence of counsel, and would most 
likely, not have testified against the defendant." BrAplt at 20. The claim lacks 
merit. 
Defendant presents this argument as a Brady violation. BrAplt at 19-21. It is 
not. A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional pre-plea discovery violations, 
including Brady violations. Medel, 2008 UT 32, I f 26-27. Instead, as the trial court 
recognized, an allegation of a pre-plea discovery violation is only relevant to the 
extent that it negates the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Id. See also State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989); Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, | 31,165 
P.3d 1195. This requires that the suppressed evidence support more than an 
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affirmative defense or impeachment; it must support factual innocence. Medel, 2008 
UT 32,^27. 
Here, the trial court reviewed that DCFS tapes and f ound that they contained 
no "new or pivotal" information that was not otherwise disclosed in discovery (R. 
145-44). The finding was correct. Months before Defendant pled, the prosecutor 
provided the defense with a summary of the DCFS interviews, which summary 
indicated that the victim was reluctant to name Defendant and did not want to get 
him into trouble (R257:12). 
The court also f ound that the DCFS tapes provided no basis to believe that the 
victim had "an inability or refusal to testify" (R145). Instead, the court found that 
though reluctant to name Defendant, the victim "plainly described sexual contact 
between herself and Defendant" (id.). A review of those interviews fully supports 
the finding. See R. 245 (Interview DVD & Transcript).5 
Defendant also claimed that victim would not hav e testified based on what he 
alleges was her failure to appear for three and one-half hours on the day of the 
scheduled preliminary hearing. Br.Aplt at 12 & 21. Below, Defendant claimed that 
his counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss when the victim did not 
5
 Moreover, the victim's testimony was not critical to the conviction of dealing 
in material harmful to a minor because the nude photographs of Defendant on the 
victim's camera could speak for themselves. 
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appear (R. 99-98 & 143). The court accepted Defendant's representation that the 
victim was late, but found no prejudice because the charges, even if dismissed, 
could have been re-filed (R. 143).6 
On appeal, Defendant abandons his claim of ineffectiveness, but nevertheless 
attacks the trial court's finding as speculation. Br.Aplt. at |21. Defendant fails to 
acknowledge, however, that the record does not support his initial premise that the 
victim failed to appropriately appear at the scheduled preliminary hearing. The 
marshaled facts establish that at the time of the scheduled hearing and before 
Defendant pled, the prosecutor informed the court that the victims' parents were in 
the courtroom and that the minor victim was in the courthouse (R115: 3). The 
prosecutor represented that she had discussed the proposed disposition with the 
victim and her parents (id.). Defendant then entered his ple^s (R115: 7). After the 
pleas were entered, the victim apparently appeared in th$ courtroom with her 
mother (R. 109). These facts establish only that the fourteeifL-y ear-old victim, like 
many victims, chose not to be in the courtroom until she was| either called to testify 
or Defendant pled guilty. 
6
 The prosecutor who responded to Defendant's motion, but who had no 
personal knowledge of what transpired on the day of the [preliminary hearing, 
likewise accepted Defendant's assertion as true, but argued i{ made no difference to 
the validity of the pleas (R257:12-13). 
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In addition to Defendant's failure to acknowledge record facts that support 
the trial court ruling, he also fails to cite contrary Utah case law. Indeed, he cites no 
Utah case law. Here, the trial court's finding that delayed disclosure of the DCFS 
tapes did not undermine ihe validity of Defendant's pleas is fully supported by 
Medel, 2008 UT 32. 
Medel was charged with sexual assault and provided with some, but not all, 
discovery before he pled guilty. Medel, 2008 UT 32, f f 3-5. Later, he discovered 
that he had not received a psychological report, which Medel claimed would have 
supported a diminished capacity defense. Id. at f 11. He alleged that his conviction 
should be vacated because the prosecutor deliberately withheld the exculpatory 
evidence to induce him to plead guilty. Id. at Iff 8-10. 
In rejecting Medel's claim, the Utah Supreme Court held that "in order for a 
guilty plea to be rendered involuntary based on the prosecution's failure to disclose 
evidence, a [defendant] must establish that the evidence withheld by the 
prosecution was material exculpatory evidence." Id. at f 33. The court further 
defined this to mean that, based on the totality of the record, the withheld 
information supported factual innocence. Id. at f f 27 & 35. 
Here, Defendant does not claim that the DCFS tapes established his factual 
innocence. Instead, he claims that if he would not have pled guilty, if he had known 
that the fourteen-year-old victim "took full responsibility for initiating the 
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relationship" and "most likely" would not testify against him. BrAplt at 20-21. 
Moreover, his claim that he was wrongfully convicted is not based on the facts, but 
on his view of what the law should be, not on the law as it exists. See BrAplt at 42 
(arguing that consensual sex between adults and minors should be lawful). 
In any case, the trial court correctly f ound the DCFS tapes did not contain new 
or pivotal information that was not otherwise available at the time of pleas (R. 144). 
This alone negates Defendant's claim that information was withheld. In sum, 
Defendant fails to establish that the trial courts factual findings concerning the 
DCFS tapes are erroneous. 
D. The trial court correctly found that a factual basis supported the 
pleas. 
The crime of dealing in material harmful to a minor is committed when a 
defendant "intentionally presents or directs any performance before a minor that is 
harmful to a minor" or "intentionally participates in any performance, before a 
minor, that is harmful to a minor." Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1206(1) (Add. A.) 
Here, it is uncontested that Defendant knew the victim was a minor. 
Material is harmful to a minor when it depicts nudity and sexual excitement 
and meets other criteria: 
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any . . . representation, in 
whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement . . . 
when it[,] taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of 
minors; is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
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community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for 
minors; and taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4) (West 2004) (numbers and paragraphing omitted) 
(Add. A). 
Defendant admitted the following facts when he plead guilty: 
(1) As a nineteen-year-old, he had sexual intercourse with the fourteen-
year-old victim numerous times over four months; 
(2) As part of that sexual relationship, he asked the victim to take 
pictures of him while he was sexually aroused; 
(3) Those pictures were "pornographic" in the context of a minor, in 
that they depicted him posing nude holding his turgid penis; 
(4) The victim not only took the photographs, but also viewed them. 
(R115: 7-8). Nevertheless, Defendant claims that, as a matter of law, these facts do 
not establish the offense of dealing in material harmful to a minor because the 
photographs were not "patently offensive" under the standard established in Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Br.Aplt at 29. He also argues that the photographs 
could not have offended this victim because she was already sexually active. Br.Aplt 
at 28. Furthermore, he claims the victim did not see the photographs, that the 
photographs were for his and her own pleasure, and that no "performance" was 
involved. Br.Aplt at 27-29. The trial court properly rejected these arguments and 
correctly found that a factual basis supported the pleas (R. 143-41). See Add. C. 
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The court correctly ruled that Mille/s obscenity standard governing adults 
does not apply to section 76-10-1206 that protects minors (R. 142-41). Instead, the 
definition of "harmful to minors" found in section 76-10-1201(4) applies (id.). See 
also State v. Burke, 675 P.2d 1198,1200 (Utah 1984) (holding the statutory definition 
constitutional in the context of minors). Here, Defendant, an adult, admitted that he 
directed a fourteen-year-old girl to photograph him as he posed in the nude holding 
his turgid penis (R. 141). The trial court correctly found this sufficient to support the 
pleas (id.). 
The trial court also properly rejected Defendant's claims that he did not 
knowingly pose for the photographs or direct the victim to take them (R. 141). The 
victim's statements and the photographs themselves fully support this finding (R. 
15-14; R115: 7-8). Moreover, in pleading guilty, Defendant admitted that he asked 
the victim to photograph him while he was sexually aroused (R115: 7-8). His 
admission at that time that the photographs were "pornographic" also supports the 
court's finding. For pornography is not a legal standard, but a sexual term that 
includes depictions of lewdness or "other erotic behavior designed to cause sexual 
excitement." Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 n.2. Here, the use of the term in the plea hearing 
accurately describes the contents of the photographs as well as Defendant's purpose 
in having the victim take them, to sexually arouse the fourteen-year-old. Clearly, 
such photographs are "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
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community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors/7 See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4)(b). 
In rejecting Defendant's claim, the trial court also recognized that though the 
issue was framed as a legal question, Defendant was really challenging the facts (R. 
143-41). The court found this inappropriate in that in pleading guilty Defendant 
admitted those facts and waived his right to require their proof (id.). 
In sum, Defendant's appellate argument has little to do with the requirements 
of existing law. Rather, he opines that fourteen-year-olds should not be protected 
from sexual predators and sexual materials. See Br.Aplt at 39-43. The Utah 
Legislature does not share his view. 
E. The trial court correctly found that the pleas were not conditioned 
upon a promise of no prison. 
Defendant contends that his pleas are "null and void" because they were 
conditioned upon a promise of no prison, yet he was sentenced to prison. Br.Aplt. at 
22-23. The claim has no merit. 
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court found that Defendant's 
pleas were conditioned only upon the dismissal of the rape charges and a referral to 
Adult Probation & Parole for a presentence report and recommendation (R. 140-39). 
Both conditions were met. The court also found that Defendant understood that 
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there were no promises regarding his sentence and recommendations of the 
prosecutor or the probation department were not binding on the court (R. 140). 
Nevertheless, Defendant suggests that the plea agreement also included a 
"promise" by the prosecutor not to recommend prison and that the prosecutor 
"betrayed" him by advocating for a prison term at sentencing. Br.Aplt. at 23. The 
record does not support the claim. Moreover, Defendant never argued below that 
the prosecutor breached the plea agreement. 
Anthony Rippa represented defendant when he pled (R. 115). Thomas Burton 
represented him when he was sentenced (R. 255). At the sentencing hearing, 
defense counsel Burton expressed his belief that "the agreement with my 
predecessor counsel was that there would be no recommended a, prison time at all, 
and I believe it was that there would be no statement [by the prosecutor] in regard 
to jail" (R255: 4-5). The court interjected that it had already found that the written 
plea agreement contained no restriction on the prosecutor's recommendations 
(R255: 6). The prosecutor then explained that in fact, she had told Mr. Rippa that 
she would not recommend a prison term, but that she had made no representations 
to him concerning jail time and felt free to support a jail sentence as recommended 
in the PSR (id.). Defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's recollection of her 
conversation with Mr. Rippa or claim that this conversation was a condition of the 
plea agreement. 
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The prosecutor then related that the victim's family had written a letter 
expressing their desire that Defendant be imprisoned (R255:7). However, the PSR, 
done in March 2006 before the aborted 90-day diagnostic referral, recommended 
probation conditioned upon a year in jail and completion of sexual-offender therapy 
(R. 101). The prosecutor made no sentence recommendation, but asked that if the 
PSR recommendation was followed, Defendant be restricted from any association 
with minors as a term of his probation (R255: 7). The court chose not to follow the 
PSR's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to prison (R255:12). 
Based on these facts, there was no violation of the plea agreement. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ORDERING PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS OF 
DEFENDANT BEFORE SENTENCING HIM 
Defendant asserts the trial court should not have ordered psychosexual or 
diagnostic evaluations because he did not plead guilty to a sex crime. Br.Aplt at 
30-31. He also argues that the use of a penile plethysinograph in the psychosexual 
evaluation was unconstitutional. Br.Aplt at 31-35. And he claims that the 
conditions of his confinement at the 90-day diagnostic unit violated his right to 
privacy and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments. Id. at 35 & 37-38. These arguments are unpreserved, not properly 
raised on appeal, and meritless. 
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A. The trial court properly ordered diagnostic assessments of 
Defendant. 
As a general rule, "a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial record before an 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551 
(Utah 1987). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of 
the very error of which counsel complains/' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,546 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). Underlying this requirement is the 
recognition that the trial court should be granted an "opportunity to correct [its 
own] errors/' State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant failed to object to the psychosexual evaluation or the 
plethysmograph, except to claim that the evaluation was flawed and biased (R253: 3 
& 6). When the court first ordered a psychosexual evaluation as part of the 
presentence investigation, Defendant did not object (R115: 8-10). Months after the 
evaluation and PSR were completed, Defendant claimed they were biased and 
sought to have a second psychosexual evaluation performed by a doctor of his own 
choosing (R253: 6). In doing so, Defendant did not argue that the court had no 
authority to order an evaluation or that use of a plethysmograph was 
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unconstitutional (id.). Consequently, the issues are waived. Alternatively, the 
claims have no merit. 
A trial court has discretion "to determine whether it has sufficient information 
to impose sentence/' State v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 8!54, 857 (Utah App. 2004). 
Moreover, ordering a psychological or other evaluation of a defendant is "clearly 
discretionary with the trial court/' State v. Gerrand, 584 P.2d 885,886 (Utah 1978). 
And while there is "some dispute in the scientific community as to the use of the 
penile plethysmograph for diagnostic purposes," this is so only because the test may 
result in "a large number of false negatives—passing as normal persons who are 
actually pedophiles." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496,499 n.6 (Utah 1998). 
In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to order a 
psychosexual evaluation because the charges Defendant plead to and the sexual 
conduct he admitted to involved a fourteen-year-old (R115: 8). The fact that the 
evaluation also included a penile plethysmograph does not disturb this discretion. 
Cf. Parker, 971 P.2d at 499 n.6 (characterizing the test as "extremely intrusive" and 
embarrassing, but "diagnostically appropriate"). This is especially true where 
Defendant opines that claims of "deviant sexual arousal patterns are laughable" in 
that they do "not take into account new sexual aggression of females engendered by 
the feminist movement's emphasis on sexual liberation regardless of age" and 
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because "Cosmopolitan magazine is the bible of many young women, even minors." 
BrAplt at 33. 
Next, Defendant attacks the constitutionality of the 90-^ day diagnostic unit by 
claiming that his constitutional rights were violated by the conditions in the unit. 
BrAplt at 35-38 (asserting that the unit does not provide sufficient recreation, 
visitation, or television time and that it provides no legitimate treatment). 
Defendant raised these arguments below only when the court notified him that the 
90-day referral was being prematurely terminated because Defendant refused to 
cooperate (R254:3-5). Then and now, Defendant claims that the unit attempted to 
brainwash him into admitting he was a sexual predatory just as the juvenile 
authorities attempted to do when he was in their custody (R256: 9-11). See also 
BrAplt at 35-36. And when the court questioned why defense counsel told 
Defendant not to cooperate, counsel attempted to justify |iis actions by further 
attacking the unit's policies (R255: 8-11). But by that time|, the issue was moot. 
Defendant was not in the unit and the unit completed no evaluation of defendant. 
Thus, the conditions of confinement in the unit had no bearing on Defendant's 
sentence. 
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B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing 
Defendant to prison. 
Defendant infers that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 
prison. Br.Aplt. at 43. The claim lacks merit. 
A trial court may impose any sentence within the boundaries set by the 
legislature. State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, Tf 9,110 P.3d 149; State v. Rhodes, 818 
P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991). That "decision will not be overturned 'unless it 
exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally 
relevant factors, or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
abuse of discretion/" State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, 1 59,191 P.3d 17. 
Here, Defendant does not allege that imposition of two concurrent terms of 
zero-to-five years imprisonment for two third-degree felony convictions exceeds the 
statutory or constitutional limits. Nor does he claim that the court failed to consider 
all legally relevant facts. Instead, he suggests merely that sentencing him to prison 
was unfair because, despite what the law says, his violations were minimal. See 
Br.Aplt. at 42-43. 
The potential of a prison sentence was explained to Defendant when he 
entered his guilty pleas (R. 42; R115:3). Nevertheless, he chose to risk that outcome 
in return for the dismissal of two counts of rape (R. 32; R115:9). In other words, he 
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traded the risk of being imprisoned for life for the risk of being imprisoned for five 
years. 
Nor can it be claimed that it was "inherently unfair" for the court to impose a 
prison sentence where Defendant had failed to benefit from ^ex-offender treatment 
in the past and, in the opinion of the court, posed a threat to the community if 
released (R115: 12). See also R. 101 (PSR). And whilei the PSR had earlier 
recommended probation and the prosecutor did not oppose Ithat recommendation, 
the court was not bound by the 2006 recommendation, especially where it did not 
reflect Defendant's attitude in 2007 towards treatment. See State v. Thurston, 781 
P.2d 1296,1301 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that a court is never bound by a 
recommendation). In sum, the trial court had no "realistic alternatives" to prison 
(R255:12). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions and sentence should be affintned. 
Respectfully submitted October 
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PART 12. PORNOGRAPHIC AND HARMFUL 
MATERIALS AND PERFORMANCES 
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 1 . Definitions 
For the purpose of this part: 
(1) "Contemporary community standards" means those current standards in 
the vicinage where an offense alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring, 
or will occur. 
(2) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials Whether with or 
without consideration. 
(3) "Exhibit" means to show. 
(4) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representa-
tion, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or 
sadomasochistic abuse when it: 
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; 
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as 
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; ai|id 
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious 
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for 
minors. 
(5) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the 
character of material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowl-
edge if a reasonable inspection or observation under the circumstances would 
have disclosed the nature of the subject matter and if a failure to inspect or 
observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is criminally 
negligent 
(6) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing, 
photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other 
figure, or any recording or transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or 
electrical reproduction, or anything which is or may be used ^s a means of 
communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, n}olds, printing 
plates, and other latent representational objects. 
(7) "Minor" means any person less than eighteen years of age. 
(8) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic 
area, or buttocks, with less than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female 
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top 
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid 
state. 
(9) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity^ whether en-
gaged in alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing, 
speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming. 
(10) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gjained by pay-
ment of a membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding 
its being designated a private club or by words of like import 
(11) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a 
person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or 
bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise 
physically restrained on the part of one so clothed. 
(12) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or 
any touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, 
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or between members of the 
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or 
actual sexual stimulation or gratification. 
(13) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female 
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual 
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity. 
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, effi April 30, 
2001. 
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 6 . Dealing in material harmful to a minor 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, 
knowing that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care 
in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to 
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a 
minor, that is harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is 
harmful to minors. 
(2) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punisha-
ble by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $300 plus $10 for each 
article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, 
without suspension of sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 14 days. 
This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(3) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each 
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by a minimum 
mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article exhibited up to 
the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without suspension of 
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than one year. This section 
supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws 
1990, c. 163, §§ 10, 11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 2000. 
§ 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 . Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time pnpr to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be annoimced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held 
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be madt within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Tide 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules 0f Civil Procedure. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, § U Laws 2003, c. 290, 
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3, 2004. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 18, 2006) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Daniel Steven White. 
4 Anthony Rippa is here in behalf of the defendant who is 
5 present. State is represented by Donna Kelly. It's case 
6 No. 051404350. Status, please. 
7 MS. KELLY: Your Honor, we've reached a resolution in 
8 this case; and the resolution is that the defendant will plead 
9 guilty as charged to Counts III and IV, third-degree felonies. 
10 State will move to dismiss Counts I and II. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. White, have you had an opportunity to 
12 discuss the matters with your legal Counsel? 
13 MR. WHITE: Yes, I have. 
14 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with that discussion? 
15 MR. WHITE: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Do you need any additional time to consult 
17 with Mr. Rippa before you proceed further? 
18 MR. WHITE: No, sir. 
19 THE COURT: Are you free from the influence of alcohol 
20 and drugs today? 
21 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Are you being treated for any type of 
23 mental illness whatsoever? 
24 MR. WHITE: (No verbal response). 
25 THE COURT: Is it fair to say that you proceeding 
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1 voluntarily, sir? 
2 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: Let's make sure you understand these 
4 charges. Count III, dealing in harmful material to a minor. 
5 I need to inquire of the State of Utah whether or not you 
6 visited with the victims or victims' families relative to this 
7 resolution? 
8 MS. KELLY: Yes, I have, your Honor. iThe victim's 
9 father and mother are here. I have talked wit|h them about the 
10 resolution. The victim is also here. She's npt present in the 
11 courtroom, but she's in the courthouse. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MS. KELLY: I've spoken with her about the resolution. 
14 They are in agreement with it. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Count III is dealing in harmful 
16 material to a minor, a third-degree felony. A third-degree 
17 felony is punishable by incarceration in the Ut^ ah State 
18 Prison for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed five 
19 years, together with a fine up to $5,000 and/ori both. Do you 
20 understand that, sir? 
21 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. It alleges that you, on or about or 
23 between June 1, 2005 and October 1, 2005 in Utah County, Utah, 
24 knowing that a person was a minor, or having failed to exercise 
25 reasonable care in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, did 
-4-
1 intentionally distribute or offer to distribute, exhibit or 
2 offer to exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors, 
3 or intentionally produce, present or direct any performance 
4 before a minor that was harmful to minors, or intentionally 
5 participated in any performance before a minor that was harmful 
6 to minors. Do you understand that charge, sir? 
7 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea of guilty 
9 to that charge because you are in fact guilty of the charge? 
10 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Going to Count IV is dealing in 
12 harmful material to a minor, also a third-degree felony. This 
13 time — let's see, it's the exact same charge? 
14 MS. KELLY: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: The same dates, the same degree, a third-
16 degree felony, the same provision from the Utah Code, with the 
17 exact same language. Sir, do you understand Count IV, dealing 
18 with harmful material to a minor, a third-degree felony? 
19 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea of guilty 
21 to that charge because you are in fact guilty of that charge? 
22 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: You have entered guilty pleas to Counts 
24 III and Count IV as set forth. You are waiving certain 
25 Constitutional rights. Among those are your right to a speedy, 
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1 public jury trial of your peers, and your right to appeal the 
2 jury verdicts if they were against you. Do you understand 
3 that, sir? 
4 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: In addition, you would be waiving the 
6 right you have to present a defense, call witnesses in your 
7 own behalf at the cost of the State of Utah, and your right to 
8 confront and cross examine witnesses or officers involved, your 
9 accusers. Do you understand that? 
10 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: You have a right to e fre^ from self-
12 incrimination. If you enter guilty pleas, you would be 
13 incriminating yourself and waiving that right. Do you 
14 understand that? 
15 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Sir, there's a presumption of innocence 
17 that attends you at all stages of these proceedings. If you 
18 enter guilty pleas, you are defeating that presumption of 
19 innocence. Do you understand that? 
20 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: Next, the State does have the burden to 
22 prove all the elements of the charges beyond a reasonable 
23 doubt. Should you enter guilty pleas, you are relieving the 
24 State of any duty or obligation to present any evidence before 































Counsel, are you satisfied your 
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client is 
proceeding voluntarily, knowingly and with full understanding? 
MR. 
THE 









I am, your Honor. 
Do you know of any legal reason why he 
guilty pleas to Count III and Count IV as 
No, your Honor. 
Okay. Sir, you have before you 
document, a statement in advance of plea. Have you 






















fully read, review and appreciate that 
Yes, sir. 
Do you read and understand the English 
Yes, sir. 
You've had how much schooling? 
Twelve years. 
Okay. Is there any word, phrase or 




Chooses to endorse the document 
you may do so. 
RIPPA: 
but if you'll just 
I'm sorry, I already got him to 




1 THE COURT: Okay, and then present it to the Court. 
2 MR. RIPPA: Just to it twice. That's fine. 
3 THE COURT: I find that he's proceeding voluntarily, 
4 knowingly and with full understanding, free ftom the influence 
5 of alcohol and drugs, not being treated for atry type of mental 
6 illness, has the benefit of capable legal Counsel. With those 
7 findings, then this Court will endorse the same. Place it in 
8 the file. Rely upon it specifically to supplement the Court's 
I 
9 colloquy. 
10 Counsel, do you waive the reading, and may I take his 
11 pleas by referring to the captions? 
12 MR. RIPPA: That's fine, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Daniel Steven White, to Count III as 
14 charged, dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third-degree 
15 felony, what is your plea? 
16 MR. WHITE: Guilty. 
17 THE COURT: To Count IV, dealing in harmful material to 
18 a minor, a third-degree felony, what is your plea? 
19 MR. WHITE: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: Is there a factual basis t<f> support that? 
21 MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor. Between June 1st of 2005 
22 and October 1st of 2005 the defendant was engaged with — in a 
23 sexual relationship with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which 
24 is in Utah County. As part of that relationship he had her 
25 take pictures of himself while sexually arouseq, and they are 
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1 pornographic — those pictures are pornographic in nature. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MS. KELLY: She not only took the pictures. She also 
4 saw them, viewed them. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MS. KELLY: Exhibited them to her. 
7 THE COURT: Is that what happened on those occasions, 
8 sir? 
9 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: I find there is a factual basis to support 
11 the entry of guilty pleas to Count III and IV. State's motion, 
12 then, to dismiss Count I and II? 
13 MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: I'll grant your motion. I'm going to refer 
15 the matter to Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence 
16 investigative report. I think in light of the fact that we're 
17 dealing with a 14-year-old girl, we also need a psycho-sexual 
18 report. 
19 MS. KELLY: We would agree with that. 
20 THE COURT: And so instead of just 45 days from today, 
21 we would set sentencing approximately 60 days from today. Now, 
22 you're entitled to be sentenced not less than 2 days or more 
23 than 45 days from today; but the Court does need a psycho-
24 sexual evaluation, and so does the — so does Adult Probation 
25 and Parole, to see whether you are a predator as it relates to 
-9-
1 young girls within our community, and whether you pose a 
2 significant risk as it relates to young victims within our 
3 community. 
4 I Counsel, do you waive the time, and can we set it 
5 about 60 days down the road? 
6 (Counsel conferring with defendant off the record) 
7 MR. RIPPA: Yeah, that's fine, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, letfs set it. 
9 COURT CLERK: March 22nd, 9 a.m. 
10 THE COURT: March 22nd, 9 a.m. I'm going to give you a 
11 referral card. I want you to get over to Adult Probation and 
12 Parole within 24 hours. 
13 MR. RIPPA: Sorry, was that March 22nd^ 
14 COURT CLERK: Yes. 
15 MR. RIPPA: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: At 9 a.m. Get over to Adult Probation 
17 and Parole within 24 hours. It's about two-and-a-half blocks 
18 from here. Cooperate with them in the preparation of a pre-
19 sentence investigative report. Cooperate with whatever doctor 
20 or treating evaluator there is as it relates to a psycho-sexual 
21 evaluation, for the benefit of the Court and benefit of Adult 
22 Probation and Parole. 
23 You have an ongoing obligation not to have any contact 
24 with her in any form or fashion, directly, indirectly or in any 
25 other way. I will order that you not be in the presence or 
-10-
1 absent supervision with any minor girl, period, during the 
2 pendency of this — during the pendency of this matter. 
3 MR. RIPPA: Your Honor, would that extend to his 
4 siblings? 
5 THE COURT: Yeah, it extends to siblings. If he's got, 
6 you know, a 12 or 13 or 14-year-old sister, of course it would. 
7 MS. KELLY: So that means unsupervised contact; he 
8 can't be alone — 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 MS. KELLY: -- with — 
11 MR. RIPPA: I understand. 
12 THE COURT: Cannot be — cannot be alone with any young 
13 girl. So that will be the order of this Court. We'll give 
14 you a referral card. Step forward, sign a promise to appear 
15 for sentencing. Get over to Adult Probation and Parole within 
16 24 hours. 
17 MS. KELLY: Thank you, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: We'll give you the referral card. Thank 
19 you very much. 
20 (Hearing concluded) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
• . •' I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary P uh • J :i • :: :i n a i i- :i f : i 11 i e 
State of .Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my ; 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible, through said recording. 
• '• • 'I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. . '• 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
. . WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 3rd day of November . 
2006.. 
My commission expires: • . jv 
February 24, 2008 .' •"
 1J^i>/?' 
•CM// 
Beverly Lowe ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in r* ^ n Couni y 




, uuiUAL DISTRICT COV#§fh * * ! ? **** C o"* 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH , , W' & ta t e of Utah 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No . pS-l1* g-4-gSo 
L X * W I I C 4 -b» . Uj H-< _, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have, been 
n< I vised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
B. 
Degree Funis iunent 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
G - s 
(3 - - £ 
n 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
* I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes), I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty, 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest):v . 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
2 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have-not) £have) waived my right to counsel. ±i i nave waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently., and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury TriaL I know that I have a rigiu to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will T.- : -• ng up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest), 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses, 1 know that "if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses iff'chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
li'i.l imony of-those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay 'those costs. • 
• '.Right to testify and/privilege against self-incrimination. !• .now that if I were to 
' have a jury trial, I would have'the right to testify on E:> own behalf I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no brie could make me testify' or make me i^ve evidence against my > v; f 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hole ; y 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 1 know thai u i ^ :, 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty . ^ 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. A t a trial, the State would have the burden of pro v 
'£3 
each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will.be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the/ 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs forme. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 
Plea bargain. My guilty (osao c ontesfop 1 ea(s)-(is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
.bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney, 411 the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea-bargain, if .any, are fiilly contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
L 
. rial judge not bound. I know-that any. charge or "sentencing concession i 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the -charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what ir.zy 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made.to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). .No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement,.or I have had it ::;a* ;o -: ry my attorney, zrz 
understand its. contents and adopt each.statement in it as my own, I know that Lam free 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, tut I lo not wish to make any 
because all of the statements are correct 
en a r 
I am satis tied with the advice and assistance of my attorney 
rU I am ^<3years of age. I have attended school 'through tht [ ^ grade, I can, read 
and "understand the English language. Ifl do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided* to me. I was not under the influence of any dings, medication, •- •• :oxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of an> drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
*ieve injsej. 10 ce 
understanding these p-
disease, defect, or im; 
or from knowing7v r 
1 urn jrse ofM 
:^iUig ilu 
uences of 
at me fron, •. J . . w standing what I oin d. 
y er/'Tir^my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before I have been sentenced and final 
judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good 
cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after sentence has been announced. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of <J^\AA^QA 20J3_V* 
Certificate of Defense Attorney-
I certify that I am the attorney for I ^ M I A £ , UWifc-> , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and tiiese, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
)R DEFENDANT 
Bar No. f i f V* 
6 
C'eiiiflcnK MI i!i ii'ii riiiin"1 AMI iriii1 v 
• T certify that that I am the attorney" for the State of Utah In the case against, 
^ defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage, 
a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in thd 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)is7ar^ntered ami that&e acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING. 





Based on the facts stt forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this . day of. * * - ***£$$%&. 
Addendum C 
r?fc,&w 
DEC 0 5 2006 
4TH DlSTRldT/ 
STATE OF WHY 
UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR1C I uURf, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State o F 1 
v s. 
Daniel Steven White, 
!>• fond ant 
MUMWIUNMIM DECISION 
Date: December 5, 
^ s c N ^ O 5 1 4 0 ^ c n 
I Imli't.' funics \i \\)\U\l' 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Withdra w '< mil y I," I" ,i 
1 lie motion bus been I'i'i'iy briefed,, uid ;i hrm "iu» w s held 'n this Court on November 9, 2006. 
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied 
i - evani factual Backgi QUI id 
1 );initi Steven While '•' r • ^ ri^d!*' cV^ed with two counts of rape (first degree 
felonies) and two counts of dealing in material harmful to a mj'nor (third degree felonies 
January IN, ,201)6, a pii'Imuiiuiy lieaiing ui IIns IMS*" v is si linlul' d Although, the victim 
appeared three and a half hours late to the hearing. Before the witness arrived. Mi White waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing and entered a gu,K> pi^ u . ." . . >• ^ .* malcinal 
I • . were dismissed by the State. After obtaining new 
counsel and prior to sentencing^ Mr White has filed a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea to the 
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two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor. 
Motion to Withdraw Plea 
Mr. White claims that because of (1) prosecutorial misconduct (2) ineffective assistance 
of counsel (3) an insufficient factual basis for dealing in harmful material to a minor under 
U.C.A. § 76-10-1206 and (4) because he did not understand the plea agreement with the State, 
the plea was not made voluntarily and knowingly. Accordingly, Mr. White asks the Court to 
allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
A plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(a) (2006). This is a change from 
the pre-2003 version, which gave the court broad discretion to allow the withdrawal of a guilty 
plea for "good cause shown." Id. (2002). A motion to withdraw a guilty plea "shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(b). Further, under Rule 11(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Court may not accept a guilty plea until it has made specific 
findings. Mr. White disputes that the Court made all of the necessary findings. Specifically, Mr. 
White claims that the Court did not adequately find that: 
(e)(2) the plea [was] voluntarily made;... 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant [understood] the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered... 
(e)(7) if the tendered plea [was] a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement ha[d] been reached; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11. Additionally, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong, 
and one who would set a plea aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal ground for 
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doing so." State v.Thurston. 781 ?.2d 1296, UUI (I Uali i t . App. I ^Myjdulcinai ulalions 
i111 in i tied). 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
i lie ^ei.wrai ru^ .^  w.ai w.i^v.i.. , . * " *>*i. <x 
1 nniwlrd -^e of that.evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it." State v. Jarrell. 608 
P.2d 218, 225 (Utah., 1980). Exculpatory evidence is "evidence tending to establish a criminal 
defendant's innocence," iildck"s Livv Dictionary, 7s' --r.-.'.x ' i.:- » .^  ier the former'version 
of U.C.A. § 77-13-6, the Utah Supreme Court found that a t:\ai .-• ml should grant a motion to 
*
x1
 draw when "new and iauspj:«.;}nj piv^ial evidence""" arises alia Hie « utiy ol (lit pled, Stale 
v. ua, legos, ; **• '- * '' :: * > •' wically Allows that if such evidence exists, a 
guilt) nlea was not done "knowingly" under the new U.C.A. § 77-13-6. 
ML White claims that theprosi'UiliH in llii1. » a:.c kcj11 VM iilp.itnit rimlnii r ('mm lnm 1m 




 hite asserts that the interview reveals the victim,, would not testify against JV* . > ;_t 
. - - ~ 'Cailu' . 4J * liib. Because of this, Mr. 
te asks the Court u> ai: ^ h;m ;o withdraw his plea. 
. n!.^  vi:i; has reviewed the liansciipLs * i Hie pnliu .iiul IXTS mien inv ivifh (he 
alleged victim. The victim, who clearly felt responsible for the sexual conduct, ako pla •
 J 
described sexual contac; hctu een he: >cl fand the Defendant, whom she eventual* -. ^\^ \ 
reluctantly , u^ciiix.' ; _ , not icual nlhei .in m.ihihly or re** * • v 
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Based on this information alone, the Court is unable to find that the DCFS interview is "new and 
indisputable pivotal evidence" arising after the entry of the plea that would allow for Mr. White's 
guilty plea to be withdrawn or showing Mr. White's plea was not done "knowingly" under 
U.C.A. §77-13-6. 
Mr. White's allegation that because the victim's constitutional rights were violated, he 
should be able to withdraw his plea is also without merit. Fourth Amendment rights are personal 
and cannot be transferred vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (U.S. 1978). 
Even if the victim's rights were violated and evidence incriminating Mr. White was found, the 
exclusionary rule would not apply to him. Id. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a 
defendant must show "(I) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard or 
reasonable professional judgment, and (ii) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
State v. Roias-Martinez. 125 P.3d 930, 932 (Utah 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsels 
behavior was not ineffective." Id. at 697. The Strickland test has been applied by the Utah 
Supreme Court in deciding whether a guilty plea was based on ineffective counsel. 
Roias-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 932. "Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993). 
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It appears Mr. White claims that his former counsel, Tony Ripjia, was ineffective because 
Rippa failed to demand the DCFS interview, he failed to make a motion to the Court to dismiss 
the charges when the victim initially did not appear at the preliminary Rearing and he advised Mr. 
White to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit. Assuming each off these allegations satisfy 
the first prong of Strickland. Mr. White has still failed to show how h^ has been prejudiced by 
any of the alleged acts of Rippa. As mentioned above, Mr. White has not shown prejudice from 
the DCFS interview. Next, had the case been dismissed because the fitness was late, the State 
would have been free to promptly refile after locating the witness. Sta|te v. Morgan, 34 P.3d 767. 
The mere failure to insist upon such a procedure rather than wait for tHe witness is not ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Further, it is likely that a continuance would halve been granted to the 
State because the witness was unavailable. Id.; State v. Rogers, 122 $.3d 661, 668 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005); State v. Atencio. 89 P.3d 191, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Finally, Mr. Rippa did not 
instruct Mr. White to plead guilty to something unsupported by the facts, which will be further 
explained below. 
Defendant's Understanding of the Elements and Natur^ of the Crime 
As stated earlier, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." U.C.A. § y7-13-6(a) (2006). Further, 
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court mijist make specific findings 
that "the defendant [understood] the nature and elements of the offence to which the plea is 
entered." Id. at Rule 11(e)(4)(A). "Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a 
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formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,444 (Utah 
1984). hi finding that the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense, the 
record may reflect compliance by the Court through multiple means including by "transcript of 
the oral colloquy between the court and defendant." State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157,1160 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998)(internal citations omitted). 
Under U.C.A. §76-10-1206, 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that a person is a 
minor, or having negligently or recklessly failed to determine the proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor 
any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, that is 
harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful to 
minors. 
(2006). The Code defines 'harmful to minors' as: 
that quality of any description or representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, 
sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when it: 
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; 
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious value includes only 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201. The Utah Supreme Court has found that this definition is 
constitutionally valid. State v. Burke, 675 P.2d 1198,1200 (Utah 1984). 
Mr. White first claims that the Utah Code violates the Constitution. The Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly found that the definition of 'harmful to minors' does not offend the 
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Constitution, Id. He next claims that he did not understand the nature and elements of the 
offense at the time of his guilty plea. The transcript of Mr. White's plea reveals that Judge Lynn 
Davis stated the elements of the dealing in material harmful to a minor and Mr. White told Judge 
Davis that he understood the charge. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing on January 18,2006, 
pages 3-4. Later in the proceeding, the prosecutor stated the factual basis for the charge as 
follows: 
Between June 1,2005 and October 1, 2005 the defendant was engaged with - in a sexual 
relationship with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which is in Utah County. As part of that 
relationship he had her take pictures of himself while sexually aroused, and they were 
pornographic - those pictures are pornographic in nature... She not Wy took the pictures. She 
also saw them, viewed them... Exhibited them to her. 
Id. at 8-9. Following the prosecutor's description, the Court asked M t White if that was what 
happened. Mr. White responded, "Yes, sir." Id. at 8. Further, Mr. White signed a statement in 
support of a guilty plea, stating that he understood the nature and the elements of the crime and 
that he committed the crime alleged. His attorney also signed the statement, stating that he 
believed that Mr. White understood the meaning of the statement. In fcoth the statement and 
record, Mr. White also asserted that his guilty plea was done voluntarily. This Court concludes 
that Mr, White understood the nature and elements of the offense anc| the law in relation to the 
facts of the case. Accordingly, this Court finds that Mr. White's guiliy plea was knowing and 
voluntary. 
Terms of Plea Agreement and Related Penalty 
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court can only accept a plea if "the 
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defendant knows of the minimum and maximum sentence" and when a plea agreement is 
reached, what the agreement is. Rule 11(e). "When a plea agreement is breached by the 
prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal 
of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Smit. 2004 UT App 222, P 17, 
95 P.3d 1203. 
Mr. White claims that he did not know that he could go to jail for these crimes, 
Additionally, he asserts by affidavit that as part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor promised 
that he would get no jail and no registration as a sex offender. In addition to Mr. White's 
affidavit, the only evidence the Court has regarding the terms of the plea agreement is Mr. 
White's statement in support of a guilty plea and the transcript of his plea. According to the 
statement, "all the promises, duties and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained 
in this statement." Statement at 5. The only terms of the agreement in the statement are "plead 
guilty to both charges under 76-10-1206(1) and refer matter to AP&P for sentencing 
recommendation." Id. The Statement further explains that any sentencing recommendation is 
not binding upon the judge. Id. The transcript supports this and adds that in exchange for Mr. 
White's plea the State agreed to dismiss the two rape counts against Mr. White. Transcript at 2. 
The Court also specifically told Mr. White of the possible punishments for the two third-degree 
felonies, which included incarceration. Id. at 3. 
From the sparse evidence provided by both parties, the Court is unable to find that the 
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plea agreement contained additional terms than those stated to Judge Davis and those in Mr. 
White's statement in support of a guilty plea. The Court finds that the agreement required the 
State to dismiss the rape charges if Mr. White pled guilty to the two counts of dealing in harmful 
material to a minor and that the matter would be referred to AP&P for sentencing. Even if the 
Court found that Mr. White's vague statements about the prosecutor promising no jail and no sex 
offender registration were established, it would be premature for the Court to find that the State 
breached those promises because the State has made no recommendations to the Court regarding 
sentencing at this time. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Daniel Steven White's motion is denied. 
Sentencing will proceed as scheduled on December 7, 2006. Counsel for the State is directed to 
file an order and findings consistent with this decision. 
Dated this £ day of i)<ic 
f 
Judge Jf^ mes R. Taylor 
Fourtn Judicial District < 
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SENTENCE IMPOSED 12 
P-R-0-C-E-E-D-I--N--G--S 
(February 15, 2007). 
THE JUDGE: State versus White. 
All right, counsel, we1re here for sentencing if 
you wish to be heard. 
MR. BURTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Thomas M. 
Burton for the defendant. The defendant is present along 
with his a, parents and brother. May I approach the court? 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
MR. BURTON: I have here a certificate from a, MPI 
which is the Pralta (phonetic) Alcohol Treatment Program in 
Oakland, California. 
THE JUDGE: Has the state seen this? 
MR. BURTON: No, Ifm going to give them a copy 
too. 
THE JUDGE: Show them first. Okay. 
MR. BURTON: And this, Your Honor, I submit is key 
to this defendant's turn around. He's had a very grievous 
problem, started with a severe automobile accident where he 
was a pedestrian, was hit by a car. And a, before that 
football was his life and this ruined his hopes and dreams 
both in high school and college football. Got on pain 
medications, became very depressed, got involved with alcohol 
and drinking, self-medication. 
Finally I believe he has reached the point where he 
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is ready to stand on his own feet. This is the reason he 
checked himself in, successfully completed it. This is one 
of the top three or four programs in the country with a 
tremendously successful rate. 
Since July 10th when he was released he has been 
clean, hefs been sober. Ifve checked with him often. I've 
tried to be like a sponsor to him. If he had any problem he 
was to call me. Fortunately his friends also supported him 
and kept him out of trouble. He went into confinement here 
on this matter in December 7th so during that time he of 
course was sober and I stayed in close touch with him. 
Since December 7th he has been incarceration here. I believe 
he served 33 days in jail and 45 days in the diagnostic 
unit. 
And a, I have great confidence in this young man. 
I have known his family for exactly 30 years. I was 
neighbors with his grandfather in California, very close, 
his grandfather's son and my son grew up together and were 
best friends. I, I have personal interest in the success of 
this young man. He's very bright, he's ready to move on with 
his life and to do good. 
And I strongly recommend that he has served enough 
time on this plea to which he pled guilty, this agreement. 
I believe the agreement initially with my predecessor counsel 



























and I believe it was that there a would be no statement in 
regard to jail. But he's been I submit both in prison and in 
jail. 
And he's, his goal is fixed on a, college, 
reactivation in his church. I am personally acquainted with 
a, someone who runs the Bechtel Investments which is a 
company his father was vice president qf and which I 
personally have represented in California for years. That 
person is Richard Kopp (phonetic), he ajssisted in getting 
the, getting Dan into treatment in Calilfornia and a, he's in, 
he's a member of the stake presidency o|f the Danville 
stake. 
Mr. White would prefer and is determined as soon as 
he's able to leave Utah and resume his iLife in California 
where both I and Mr. Kopp would stay in close touch with him 
since I'm back and forth all the time. 
So I strongly urge and recommend that this young 
man be released. We've also asked that these a, two felony 
charges be combined into one since they were part of the 
same process and sign, date, everythingt Also that the 
court consider reducing this one fleeting incident to a 
Class A misdemeanor and that he be released. I would like 
to see him released altogether. If there is a probation we'd 
like to use the interstate compact in oifder to have him do 
that in California. I think it's important that he get away 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
from whatever influences he may have been involved with here 
in this state and start anew down there. He has no adult 
criminal record and a, and he's had nothing in the last seven 
years that would suggest that he's a risk to society or to 
himself. He's turned the corner, I am firmly convinced of 
that. 
And I'm happy to have the court question him if the 
court wishes, and I don't— 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Kelly? 
MS. KELLY: Your Honor if I could just review what 
the plea, statement in advance of plea says. 
THE JUDGE: The statement in advance of plea 
agreement and the statement in advance of plea says plead 
guilty to both charges and refer matter to Adult Probation 
and Parole for sentencing and recommendation. That's it. 
MS. KELLY: I had agreed with Mr. Ripple 
(phonetic) his previous counsel not to recommend a prison 
term. But there was, according to my memory there was no 
agreement on jail in the county jail. I was free to 
recommend that. 
THE JUDGE: It doesn't, it doesn't say. It just 
says refer for Adult Probation and Parole recommendation. So 
whatever, that's all that's in the memorandum. Whatever, I'm 




























MS. KELLY: Okay. I'm willing to concede that we 
agreed not to recommend a prison term. 
The victim's family in this case is not here 
present but has, has been to numerous Court hearings on this 
and they did write a letter to the court. I believe they 
are, would like to see a prison term imposed. 
I really have enjoyed working with Mr. Burton but I 
strongly disagree with his assessment of Mr. White. I think 
he's a serious risk to the community. He's had years of 
sexual offending issues that he refused to deal with and 
still even now. Even when it was to his advantage to go up 
to the diagnostic and cooperate and get a good recommendation 
from them he either would not or could not do that. He's, 
he's a serious risk to the community and to young girls. 
Another individual called me recently, he's the 
father of a young girl whom Daniel White had contact with 
while he was awaiting sentencing on this case, she was 17 at 
the time. He's here if the court woul<^  want to hear from 
him. Took advantage of, of his daughter. 
So I think he's a serious risk to the young girls 
of whatever community he's in. 
We'd ask that the court, in addition to what's 
been recommended we'd ask that he have no contact with 
minors whatsoever because I think that that's a, what's 



























So other than that we'll submit it. 
MR. BURTON: I'd like to simply respond. This 
is the purpose of my motions and by memorandum is that this 
case needs to stay focused on the guilty plea. That's what 
we're here about today. And none of this has any relevance 
at all. If we want it get fair afield and talk about a,— 
THE JUDGE: Well I think his attitude and his 
amenability to treatment or therapy is certainly relevant to 
sentencing, isn't it? 
MR. BURTON: I believe his attitude is manifest by 
his self referrals to— 
THE JUDGE: Well, but the question is it's 
relevant, isn't it? Isn't his attitude relevant to 
sentencing? 
MR. BURTON: Well, his attitude is always 
relevant. 
THE JUDGE: I understand that you're telling me 
your position is he has a good attitude. But it is relevant, 
it's something I must consider, is it not? 
MR. BURTON: If the court please, that is relevant 
in a sense as long as we stay focused on what he pled guilty 
to. His attitude in the diagnostic was my doing because he 
was there being required to disclose and reveal everything 
ever in his life and I— 
THE JUDGE: Counsel, why would you do that as an 
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officer of the court if it was your doing? Why would you 
counsel, why would you as an officer of the court cause 
someone to frustrate and undermine an order that I have 
made? 
MR. BURTON: I am not seeking to frustrate your 
orders, Your Honor, I!m— 
THE JUDGE: You directed your client to not 
participate. 
MR. BURTON: To not answer questions that would 
be possible subject him to prosecution. And as I submitted 
in my last memorandum, authority from the United States 
Supreme Court that in any proceeding, administrative or 
whatever, he is not required nor should he be required to 
answer questions which then could subject him to further 
prosecution. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I understand. 
MR. BURTON: I had no choice, to protect him I 
had to do that. I don't know what the practice is here. 
Someone could say well we would never do that, this is part 
of the treatment. 
Also I have serious reservations as to these kinds 
of treatments. They don!t seem to be helpful in most 
cases. They are subject to a great deal of criticism in 
terms of forcing people to acknowledge responsibilities where 



























terrible, that they, they have problems, that they don't 
have, that they are recidivus when they are not. It's 
total brainwashing. And I have not only have criticisms of 
this unit and its, and its methodology but I have sued a 
number of programs dealing with youth in this state and 
others that use this same methodology which does nothing 
but increase rage and because post-traumatic stress. Yes, 
you may want to force someone and beat them down to 
confessing everything in their life is their fault and have 
to rebuilt them again. But confrontation has never in any 
evidentiary way, even (inaudible word) way shown to be 
successful in long-term turnarounds. And it's, there are 
numerous studies I can cite on that. It's just not a good 
program. 
Here's a young man who did not pray on anybody, has 
never done anything to force anyone. The young woman in this 
case submitted she was the instigator and refused to 
implicate him for that reason. And yet in that diagnostic 
program he's being forced to say everything is my fault, I'm 
the predator, I'm responsible, I did this wrong, I did that 
wrong, when it's not the truth. I'm interested in the 
truth. And to brainwash people into convincing them that 
they are somehow criminal liabilities and a danger to 
society is completely wrong. 



























the manuals for this kind of program and whoever thought up 
this kind of methodology, and very difficult to obtain them.. 
I, and I continued with the presentence report, I continued 
with Dr. (inaudible word) report. Total misrepresentations, 
total bias, total one-sidedness. 
And so please don't, please don't blame this 
defendant for not being cooperative and not admitting he's a 
terrible person and not admitting he needs help and treatment 
as a sexual predator. I don't believe he is, I don't believe 
he believes he is, and I resent the state trying to force him 
into thinking he is. The only thing we're talking about here 
were two fleeting pictures which he didn't take or you know, 
the court knows all of that. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Is there anything more? 
Mr. White, do you wish to be heard? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. I think he does. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I realize that 
what I did was wrong, I shouldn't have allowed it to 
happen. I'm trying to change my life. In the last two 
years where this is, this case has been going on I have a, 
tried to get into college. I was scheduled to go and I ended 
up getting arrested the day that I was supposed to go, so 
that fell through. 
I've been talking to a lot of my a, past 
girlfriends and a, basically apologizing for any of the rude 
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or a, bad things that I've ever done to them. I am 
currently in contact with four of them which a, have been a, 
good support system in my trying to get off of alcohol and 
drugs. I'm currently a, talking to one of them about 
possibly getting married. 
I'm just hoping the court will give me a chance to 
try again. This is my first offense as an adult. And I 
pretty much stayed clean and out of the court system for 
seven years, my last offense was when I was 12 years old. 
And I just want a chance. 
THE JUDGE: Well, counsel, these are serious 
matters. The court does not view offenses as minor 
offenses, they are serious offenses. And a, I'm satisfied 
from the reports and the information that I do have that your 
client, I cannot find that the client is safe to be released 
in the community, I haven't been given any realistic 
alternatives. 
I'm going to sentence Mr. White to a term in the 
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years on each of the two 
Counts, those Counts may run concurrently one with the 
other. A fine in the amount of $2,000. I am going to order 
you committed to the Utah State Prison for execution of the 
sentence. 
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